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THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF FEDERAL TAX LIENS
WITH A SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THEIR
EFFECT ON MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES
By WiLum F. MosNER*
The broad field of federal taxation is so complex that
even those lawyers who make tax law their specialty con-
centrate on only one subdivision of the entire field. This is
made necessary by the constant amendments and additions
to the tax laws which, together with the technical regula-
tions promulgated by the Treasury Department, form such
a body of statutory laws that complete familiarity with all
of its facets is virtually impossible. A great number of our
attorneys with general practices recognize these facts and
will, more often than not, refer most tax problems to the
specialists rather than delve into those forbidding grounds
themselves. There is, however, one aspect of federal tax law,
namely tax liens, that crops up daily in the most routine
matters confronting the practicing attorney, and he should
have at least a speaking acquaintance with the subject.
It is here proposed to discuss the general nature of tax
liens, to speak briefly of their scope, and to point out the
effect which tax liens have on mortgage foreclosures and
the procedures by which the title coming through such fore-
closures can be cleared of the Government's lien.
ASSFsSMENT AND DEmAND
When any of the various taxes imposed by Federal law
is due and unpaid, the Internal Revenue Service is author-
ized to compute the amount due and assess the taxpayer
therefor. A lien against the taxpayer in like amount then
comes into being by virtue of the formal assessment which
is made by the Secretary of the Treasury. The authority
* Of the Baltimore County Bar; LL.B., 1952, University of Maryland
School of Law; Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Mary-
land, June, 1954 - September, 1956.
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for this assessment is found in Section 6201,' and Section
62032 provides that the assessment is made legally binding
by recording the computed liability of the taxpayer in the
office of the Secretary or his delegate. By virtue of tax
regulations8 the proper delegate is the District Director of
Internal Revenue for each collection district.
After the tax has thus been assessed and recorded, the
District Director, within sixty days, must give notice there-
of and make demand on the taxpayer for payment.' The
authorities appear clear that such a formal demand is
essential to a valid lien, for in Detroit Bank v. United
States,5 the Supreme Court, by dictum, makes the flat
statement:
"Under R.S. 3186 (now Sec. 6321) there is no lien
and no notice can be recorded until there has been a
demand by the collector and a refusal to pay it by the
taxpayer."6
The court in In Re Baltimore Pearl Hominy Co., also by
dictum, held that demand was a necessary prerequisite to
a lien. But, in Macatee, Inc. v. United States,' the Court
held that the demand is for the protection of the taxpayer,
and that, although it must be made before the United States
can enforce its lien, the demand does not necessarily have
to be made after the time of assessment on the District
Director's books to give the tax lien priority over other
creditors. In this case the demand for payment was made
before assessment, and the Court held that the lien arose
at the time the District Director received the assessment
list without further demand necessary.9
I The sections referred to herein, unless otherwise indicated, are con-
tained in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; Title 26, United States Code
Annotated (1955 and Supp., 1956).
2 Ibid.
' Fed. Tax Reg. (1956), §301.6201-1.
'Sec. 6303.
5317 U. S. 329 (1943).
4 Ibid, 335. Parenthetical material added.
'5 F. 2d 553 (4th Cir., 1925). See also United States v. Ettelson, 159 F.
2d 193 (7th Cir., 1947) ; In Re Holdsworth, 113 F. Supp. 878 (D. C. N. J.,
1953) ; United States v. Elland, 223 F. 2d 118 (4th Cir., 1955).
'214 F. 2d 717 (5th Cir., 1954).
9 It should be noted in regard to Federal estate taxes that there does not
have to be assessment and demand before a lien arises. By virtue of See.
6324, the lien attaches automatically at date of decedent's death upon his
gross estate (except the part used for costs of administration and charges
against the estate allowed by court) - including property held as tenants
by the entirety. As held in the Detroit Bank case, supra, n. 5, this lien for
estate taxes formerly did not have to be recorded to be valid against sub-
sequent purchasers or mortgagees without notice; but in 1942 the Internal
Revenue Act was amended [now See. 6324(2)] to release the estate tax lien
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ScoPE OF TAX LIEN
Assuming the formal requisites of assessment and de-
mand, the Federal statute specifically establishes a lien for
unpaid taxes in Section 6321 and, says the Supreme Court,
"[S]tronger language could hardly have been selected to
reveal a purpose to assure the collection of taxes."'"
Section 6321 provides:
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or
refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount
(including any interest, additional amount, addition
to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs
that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in
favor of the United States upon all property and rights
to property, whether real or personal, belonging to
such person."
The law is clear that the effect of this lien, once it is
established as set out above, cannot be negated by State
laws giving priority to special local liens arising after the
tax lien has attached. The Federal law is the supreme law
of the land, and in deciding priorities the courts have fol-
lowed the "first in time, first in right" theory regardless of
State statutes which might allow certain after-acquired
liens (mechanics', state taxes, etc.) to relate back and take
priority over tax liens already on the books."
It is basic and elemental in any attempt to comprehend
the scope of tax liens to realize fully that, from their incep-
tion, they are general and perfected liens on all personal
and real property belonging to the taxpayer. The ordinaryjudgment is general and perfected as to realty, but it is no
lien whatsoever on personalty until execution and seizure
are accomplished. A junior tax lien, therefore, would take
precedence over senior judgments as to all personal assets
in the hands of the taxpayer at time of assessment; and if
the holder of the judgment sought to execute on the per-
sonalty he would find it already encumbered with a per-
fected lien. The Greenville case describes the nature of the
lien as follows: "After the lien provided by the statute
from such parts of the gross estate as are transferred by heirs, legatees,
surviving spouse, executors, etc. (to bona fide purchasers) without payment
of the estate tax. Under the new law, the tax lien, in addition to property
still in the estate, would now attach to all property owned by the transferor,
and the lien is good for a period of ten years.
20 Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U. S. 265, 267 (1945).
n United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F. 2d 963 (4th Cir., 1941).
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attaches, the [taxpayer's] property has in a sense two
owners, the taxpayer and, to the extent of the lien, the
United States."' 2
There is no property of the tax-debtor which escapes the
all-encompassing reach of the tax lien, and the Fourth Cir-
cuit has recently allowed the Government to levy adminis-
tratively for payment of the tax on such intangible property
as a debt due the taxpayer."3
In determining the property to which a tax lien attaches
and property upon which levy for payment can be made,
there is no necessity to be concerned with the various State
exemption statutes. It is well settled that the individual
States cannot pass laws exempting certain property or
assets from creditors, and thereby defeat collection of Fed-
eral taxes. 4 The lien attaches, however, only to property
owned by the taxpayer, and the courts will look to State
law to determine ownership.15 The tax lien does not, there-
fore, attach to property held by husband and wife as tenants
by the entirety," but after-acquired property does come
within the scope of the tax encumbrance. 17
TwE LIEN ARISES
Although under Section 6303, a demand within sixty
days after assessment is essential to make the lien valid,
when this is accomplished, the lien itself attaches, not as of
the date of demand, but as of the date of original assess-
ment, pursuant to Section 6322:
"Unless another date is specifically fixed by law,
the lien imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time
the assessment is made and shall continue until the
liability for the amount so assessed is satisfied or be-
comes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time."' 8
Ibid, 965.
See United States v. Elland, supra, n. 7, where a petition filed in bank-
ruptcy after the levy was held not to affect the Government's lien rights.
The cash surrender value of an insurance policy is likewise subject to the
tax lien; United States v. Behrens, 130 F. Supp. 93 (D. C. E. D. N. Y., 1955).
' Cannon v. Nicholas, 90 F. 2d 934 (10th Cir., 1935) ; Knox v. Great West
Life Assur. Co., 212 F. 2d 784 (6th Cir., 1954).
5Cannon v. Nicholas, ibid; Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930) ; United
States v. Hutcherson, 188 F. 2d 326 (8th Cir., 1951) ; Jones v. Kemp, 144 F.
2d 478 (10th Cir., 1944).
1 United States v. Hutcherson, tbid; Shaw v. United States, 94 F. Supp.
245 (D. C. W. D. Mich., 1939).
1
, Glass City Bank v. United States, aupra, n. 10.
See discussion, infra, circa, p. 12, concerning limitations as to the
meaning of "unenforceable by reason of lapse of time".
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It is apparent here that the gap between time of assess-
ment and time of demand might cause difficulty where
other creditors' rights accrue during that period. The prob-
lem is mostly academic, however, as mortgagees, pur-
chasers, pledgees, and judgment creditors who may acquire
their rights during this period are protected by Section 6323
which requires a prior recording of tax liens to give them
priority over such competing interests. And as to general
creditors who extend credit prior to, during, and after the
period in question, the tax lien would always take preced-
ence, since general creditors have no lien whatsoever until
they pursue their claims to judgment. Some difficulty
might be encountered where a statutory state lien attaches
and becomes choate during the period between assessment
and demand; and, whether the tax lien would then date
back to the time of assessment to give it priority under the
"first in time, first in right" theory has not been decided by
the courts. 9 MacKenzie v. United States recognizes the
possible inconsistency between Sections 6321 and 6322, but
the particular point was not decided.2 °
Following the reasoning of the Macatee21 case which
holds the demand is entirely for the protection of the tax-
payer, it would appear that the tax lien should take priority
from time of assessment regardless of interests intervening
prior to demand. These interests have no more knowledge
of the demand than of the assessment, and there would be
little force to an argument that they were deprived of a
substantial right because the demand was not made before
their lien attached.
RECORDING REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES
Under the law discussed above, it would appear that the
tax lien approaches omnipotence, and that lenders or buyers
who do not check the District Director's assessment lists
act at their peril in dealing with parties whose tax status
is unknown. Indeed, such was originally the state of the
law, and the unrecorded tax lien was held superior to all in-
terests postdating it even though it enjoyed semi-secrecy
by being recorded only on the assessment lists in the
various District Directors' offices. 22 The jeopardy to other
bona fide interests which resulted from such legislation
"MacKenzie v. United States, 109 F. 2d 540 (9th Cir., 1940).
0 See also United States v. New Britain, 347 U. S. 81 (1954) and Filipo-
wlcz v. Rothensies, 43 F. Supp. 619 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1942).
22214 F. 2d 717 (5th Cir., 1954).
12 United States v. Snyder, 149 U. S. 210 (1893).
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was not allowed to long continue, however, and protection
for four high priority classes is now afforded by the public
notice required in Section 6323.28 As a result of this statute,
n Sec. 6323 provides:
(a) Invalidity of Lien Without Notice. - Except as otherwise provided
in subsection (c), the lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be
valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment
creditor until notice thereof has been filed by !the Secretary or his
delegate-
(1) Under state or territorial laws. - In the office designated by
the law of the State or Territory in which the property subject
to the lien is situated, whenever the State or Territory has by
law designated an office within the State or Territory for the
filing of such notice; or
(2) With clerk of district court. - In the office of the clerk of the
United States District Court for the judicial district in which
the property subject to the len is situated, whenever the State
or Territory has not by law designated an office within the
State or Territory for the filing of such notice; or
(3) With clerk of district court for District of Columbia. - In the
office of the clerk of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, if the property subject to the lien is
situated in the District of Columbia.
(b) Form of notice. - If the notice filed pursuant to subsection (a) (1)
is in such form as would be valid if filed with the clerk of the
United States District Court pursuant to subsection (a) (2), such
notice shall be valid notwithstanding any law of the State or Terri-
tory regarding the form or content of a notice of lien.
(c) Exception in case of securities.
(1) Exception. - Even though notice of a lien provided in section
6321 has been filed in the manner prescribed in subsection (a)
of this section, the lien shall not be valid with respect to a
security, as defined in paragraph (2) of this subsection, as
against any mortgagee, pledgee, or purchaser of such security,
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth, if at the :time of such mortgage, pledge, or purchase
such mortgagee, pledgee, or purchaser is without notice or
knowledge of the existence of such lien.
(2) Definition of security. - As used in this subsection, the term
"security" means any bond, debenture, note, or certificate or
other evidence of indebtedness, issued by any corporation (in-
cluding one issued by a government or political subdivision
thereof), with interest coupons or in registered form, share of
stock, voting trust certificate, or any certificate of interest or
participation in, certificate of deposit or receipt for, temporary
or interim certificate for, or warrant or right to subscribe to
or purchase, any of the foregoing; negotiable instrument; or
money.
(d) Disclosure of amount of outstanding lien. - If a notice of lien has
been filed under subsection (a), the Secretary or his delegate is
authorized to provide by rules or regulations the extent to which,
and the conditions under which, information as to the amount of
the outstanding obligation secured by -the lien may be disclosed."
Following the original enactment of this law, the State of Maryland
adopted the Uniform Federal Tax Lien Registration Act, Md. Code (1951),
Art. 17, Secs. 12-18, to comply with subparagraph (a) (1), and it provides
in general:
"12. Notices of liens for taxes payable to the United States of
America and Certificates discharging such liens shall be filed in the
office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the county, and the Clerk of
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the Internal Revenue Service records its tax liens in every
county wherein it believes the taxpayer may have assets;
and such recording operates to give notice of the Govern-
ment's claim in much the same manner as the civil judg-
ment docket gives public notice of these liens. It has been
held that under this statute the individual states may decree
only the place in which the notice of lien must be recorded,
but not the manner of execution of notices to be filed by the
Government.24
There is little trouble with recording procedure under
Section 6323 so far as realty is concerned since it has fixed
situs, and the tax lien must necessarily be filed in the
county where the land lies before it will attach thereto as
against the parties mentioned in the statute.2 5 Where per-
sonalty is involved, however, there may be some question
as to where the lien should be recorded. The law says the
notice should be filed in the county where the property is
located, but it does not specify whether this means where
the Superior Court of Baltimore City, within which the property sub-
ject to such lien is situated.
"13. When a notice of such tax lien is filed, the Clerk of the Circuit
Court of the county, and the Clerk of the Superior Court of Baltimore
City, shall forthwith enter the same in an alphabetical Federal Tax
Lien Index, showing on one line the name and residence of the tax-
payer named in such notice, the Collector's serial number of such notice,
the date and hour of filing, and the amount of tax with the interest,
penalties and costs. He shall file and keep all original notices so filed
in numerical order in a file or files, and designated Federal Tax Lien
Notices.
"14. When a certificate of discharge of any tax lien issued by the
Collector of Internal Revenue or other proper officer, is filed in the
office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the county, and the Clerk of
the Superior Court of Baltimore City, where the original notice of lien
is filed, said Clerk of the Circuit Court of the county, and -the Clerk of
the Superior Court of Baltimore City, shall enter the same with date
of filing in said Federal Tax Lien Index on the line where notices of
the lien so discharged is entered, and permanently attach -the original
certificate of discharge to the original notice of lien.
"15. Said Federal Tax Lien Index and file or files for said Federal
Tax Lien Notices shall be furnished to the Clerk of the Circuit Court
of the county, and the Clerk of the Superior Court of Baltimore City,
in the manner now provided by law for the furnishing of books in
which deeds are recorded.
"16. Sections 12-18 are passed for the purpose of authorizing the
filing of notices of liens in accordance with the provisions of Section
3186 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended by the
Act of March 4, 1913, 37 Statutes at Large, page 1016, and any Acts or
parts of Act amendatory thereof."
"Union Planters National Bank v. Godwin, 140 F. Supp. 528 (D. C. E. D.
Ark., 1956).
w Although there are apparently no reported decisions on the point, it is
the opinion of the Internal Revenue Service that purchase money mortgages
take priority over tax liens, even where the tax lien is of record prior to
the purchase money mortgage. There is danger of clouded title in the event
foreclosure takes place, however, and the manner in which to prevent this
is discussed later herein, circa, pp. 12 et seq.
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located at the time the tax lien is put on record, where
located at the time competing interests acquire their lien,
or where located at the time priority is asserted. When we
are dealing with movable chattels, the persons mentioned
in Section 6323 could acquire their rights in a county within
the United States where there may be absolutely no record
of the tax lien. To require the Government to record in
each of these counties would be an impossible burden not
required by the statute; and it seems that the most logical
rule follows the general law that the situs of personalty
follows the domicile of its owner, and if the tax lien is there
recorded it attaches to chattels no matter where they may
be located, even if in another state.2 6 Where, however,
there is personalty which has a distinct situs disconnected
from the owner's domicile (such as stock in trade, a sea-
going vessel, etc.), it would seem that the notice should be
there recorded, regardless of domicile.2 7 It will make an in-
teresting case, indeed, when a Californian sells his automo-
bile in Maryland on December second, and the Government
then attempts to seize it from the purchaser because of a
tax lien filed in the California county of domicile on De-
cember first!
Particular notice should also be given to the fact that
under the uniform act the tax lien encumbrance is found
not in the land, chattel or judgment records, but in a
separate Federal Tax Lien Index.
In construing Section 6323, the courts have held its
provisions mandatory, and the Government must comply
with the recording provisions before another party obtains
the status of purchaser, mortgagee, pledgee, or judgment
creditor, even though such other party may have actual
knowledge of the tax liability."8 But, once the Government
has complied with these provisions, the individual states
cannot defeat the collection priority by arbitrary legisla-
tion declaring certain lienors to be within the protection of
Section 6323. For example, a local statute declaring that a
state tax assessment, a mechanic's lien, or the like, has
"'Grand Prairie State Bank v. United States, 206 F. 2d 217 (5th Cir.,
1953) ; United States v. Spreckels, 50 F. Supp. 789 (D. C. N. D. Cal., 1943) ;
Investment & Securities Co. v. United States, 140 F. 2d 894 (9th Cir., 1944).
2 Gulf Coast Marine Ways v. The J. C. Hardee, 107 F. Supp. 379 (D. C.
S. D. Tex., 1952) ; United States v. The Pomere, 92 F. Supp. 185 (D. C. D.
Hawaii, 1950).
2United States v. Beaver Run Coal Co., 99 F. 2d 610 (3rd Cir., 1938).
In revising the Internal Revenue Code into the Act of 1954, the House
attempted to make the lien binding upon those with notice even though it
was not recorded. See 3 U. S. Code Cong. and Adm. News (1954), p. 4554.
The Senate deleted this change, however, (p. 5224), the Conference agreed
with the Senate, and the final bill did not change prior law.
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the force of a judgment is not controlling. The Supreme
Court has declared that definition of the terms used in
Section 6323 should be uniform throughout the states, and
"judgment creditor" in the statute is held to be intended
in the usual, conventional sense of a judgment of a court of
record, regardless of state legislation.29 This does not mean,
however, that State liens are outlawed by Section 6323 and
are always inferior to the federal claim. Section 6323 is
intended for the protection of the classes named therein,
but it does not purport to give the Government a footstool
with which to raise itself above other statutory liens of
equal dignity.30 The priority schedule may be compared
to a hypothetical race where a state statutory lien wins
(first in time), the federal tax lien is second, and a judg-
ment third. If the federal tax lien is recorded, there is no
change in position; but if it is unrecorded then the dis-
qualification of Section 6323 places it third and the judg-
ment takes over second position. Should the federal tax
lien win and be recorded, it retains first position; but if it is
unrecorded the judgment moves ahead of it although the
statutory lien may not. The Government's failure to record
can in no wise give an advantage to any but a mortgagee,
pledgee, purchaser or judgment creditor, and its priority
with state statutory liens is judged always from the date
of assessment.
The above example presupposes that the statutory liens
are choate, i.e., specific and perfected, as they can other-
wise be afforded no priority over the perfected tax lien.3
An example of an inchoate lien is shown in United States
v. Security Trust and Savings Bank, 2 where the Court
held that a Federal tax lien, recorded after an attachment
on original process but before judgment was rendered in
the case, took precedence, as the attaching creditor did not
have a perfected judgment prior to the recording of the
tax lien, nor did he have a choate lien before the tax assess-
ment arose. Similarly, he would not have had a choate lien
if the assessment were made after the original attachment,
as at that time the attaching creditor had not secured judg-
ment and his lien was not, therefore, perfected. This case
also holds that the effect of a lien is a Federal question, and
a State's classification of a particular lien as specific and
perfected is not binding against the United States. A state's
classification of a lien as inchoate is held practically con-
"'United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U. S. 361 (1953).
10 United States v. Peoples Bank, 197 F. 2d 898 (5th Cir., 1952).
9 United States v. New Britain, 347 U. S. 81 (1954).
82340 U. S. 47 (1950).
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clusive, however. 8 The concurring opinion of Justice Jack-
son in the Security Trust case8 ' is interesting as it traces
the history of Section 6321 and shows that originally it
created a secret lien taking precedence even without re-
cordation. The Supreme Court has recently held that a
mechanic's lien, filed but not reduced to judgment, remains
inchoate so that a tax lien subsequently recorded is entitled
to priority.85
In dealing with realty, the schedule of priority among
recorded encumbrances (including tax liens) can easily be
determined by listing them in the chronological order of
recordation. When we consider the judgment creditor in
relation to his debtor's personalty, however, the problem is
more difficult since judgment creditors have no lien on
personalty regardless of the date of judgment. The institu-
tion of execution proceedings by such a creditor after the
recordation of a tax lien would, therefore, find the per-
sonalty already subject to a specific encumbrance which
must be satisfied before the assets can be applied to thejudgment. The only manner in which the tax lien can be
defeated by the judgment creditor under these circum-
stances is by the judgment creditor's reducing the per-
sonalty to his constructive possession through issuance and
delivery of a fi fa to the Sheriff prior to the time the tax
lien arises.8 6
LIMITATIONS
Having discussed in general the manner in which tax
liens arise and the property to which they attach, we now
pass to the important aspect of determining during what
period the lien is operative. As we have seen, the lien arises
upon assessment and demand, but it does not bind forever;
and the law provides a period of limitations after which the
Government cannot seek to collect its taxes.
Section 6501 provides the general rule that the tax must
be assessed within three years after a return is filed or, if
payable by stamp, within three years after the tax is due;
and without this timely assessment, no court proceedings
for the collection of tax can be instituted after the expira-
I See also United States v. Acri, 348 U. S. 211 (1955) ; U. S. A. v. Elsenger
Mill & Lumber Co., 202 Md. 613, 98 A. 2d 81 (1953).
Supra, n. 32, cono. op. 51.
United States v. White Bear Brewing Oo., Inc., 350 U. S. 1010 (1956),
reh. den. 351 U. S. 958 (1956); United States v. Colotta, 350 U. S. 808
(1955), rev'g. 79 So. 2d 474 (Miss., 1955).
1 United States v. Levin, 128 F. Supp. 465 (D. C. Md., 1955); United
States v. Fisher, 93 F. Supp. 73 (D. C. N. D. Cal., 1948); of. Gilbert Asso-
ciates, supra, n. 29.
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tion of the three-year period. The exceptions to this general
rule are:
1. False return - no limitation on collection.
2. Wilful attempt to evade tax - no limitation on
collection.
3. Failure to file return - no limitation on collection.
4. Waiver agreement - limitations tolled by tax-
payer's waiver.
5. For other exceptions, see further provisions of
Section 6501.
If the assessment has been made within the time pre-
scribed, the lien arises; but, even though it attaches to all
of the taxpayer's property, it does not attach with finality,
and collection of the tax must be made within the period
prescribed in Section 6502 which provides:
"(a) Length of period. - Where the assessment of any
tax imposed by this title has been made within the
period of limitation properly applicable thereto,
such tax may be collected by levy or by a pro-
ceeding in court, but only if the levy is made or
the proceeding begun-
(1) within six years after the assessment of the
tax, or
(2) prior to the expiration of any period for col-
lection agreed upon in writing by the Secre-
tary or his delegate and the taxpayer before
the expiration of such six-year period (or, if
there is a release of levy under section 6343
after six-year period, then before such re-
lease).
The period so agreed upon may be extended by
subsequent agreements in writing made before
the expiration of the period previously agreed
upon.")
It can be seen from this statute that in the ordinary case
of non-payment of taxes where a return was filed, the
Government has nine years in which to initiate collection
proceedings - three years under Section 6501 to assess,
and six years thereafter to collect. In this regard it should
be noted that the filing of a tax return does not begin the
running of collection limitations, but rather the critical
19571
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date is the time the assessment is made on the books of the
Treasury Department." And in cases where no return
whatsoever is filed, the Government must still make its
collection within six years after it puts the assessment on
the books."
The ambit of Federal tax liens has been shown to be
much broader than that of ordinary judgments, but Section
6502 affords them a considerably shorter life-span. In order,
however, to continue the lien effective, the Government
need only bring suit on the tax debt within the six-year
period and have the lien reduced to judgment. Collection
may then be enforced at any time, 9 and the judgment car-
ries with it all the characteristics of the original lien,
extending also to personalty. °
The Courts have been most liberal in construing the
"proceeding in court" phrase used in Section 6502, and have
held that filing a claim for unpaid taxes of the deceased
in Probate Court is such a proceeding as will toll limita-
tions.41 Even filing a tax claim with the administrator of
an estate is a "proceeding in court".42
Where, however, the assessment is not made within the
time designated in Section 6501 and/or collection is not
enforced as provided by Section 6502, then the lien expires
as it is "unenforceable by reason of lapse of time".43
RELEASE AND DISCHARGE
We come now to a point which has apparently escaped
the attention of many attorneys engaged in clearing titles
and foreclosing mortgages - the manner in which property
may be released from the cloud of a tax lien.
Considering first the statutory law, we find the pro-
visions for a certificate of release set out in Section 6325.
The release may be granted if:
1. The tax is paid or is legally unenforceable. 44
1 Davidovitz v. United States, 58 F. 2d 1063 (Ct. Cl. 1932).
"United States v. Updike, 281 U. S. 489 (1930).
8United States v. Havner, 101 F. 2d 161 (8th Cir., 1939) ; In Re Bowen,
58 F. Supp. 286 (D. C. E. D. Pa., 1944) ; United States v. Caldwell, 74 F.
Supp. 114 (D. C. M. D. Tenn., 1947) ; Investment & Securities Co. v. United
States, 140 F. 2d 894 (9th Cir., 1944).
40 Investment & Securities Co. v. United States, ibid.; United States v.
Ettelson, 67 F. Supp. 257 (D. C. E. D. Wis., 1946), aff'd. 159 F. 2d 193
(7th Cir., 1947) ; United States v. Caldwell, ibid.
"United States v. Ettelson, ibid.
2United States v. First Nat. Bank, 54 F. Supp. 351 (D. C. N. D. Ohio,
1943).
"Cf. Sec. 6322, discussed supra, circa, p. 4.
See discussion under Limitations, supra, circa, p. 10.
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2. Bond is furnished assuring payment of the tax.
3. Other property of the taxpayer is double the value
of both the tax lien and other liens superior to that
of the Government.
4. The Government is paid, in part satisfaction of the
whole debt, the value of the specific property for
which discharge is sought.
5. It is determined that the tax lien has no value as to
the specific property for which discharge is sought.
These alternatives are the only direct methods provided
by the Internal Revenue Code for the release of the statu-
tory lien created by Section 6321, and their significance is
often times overlooked by the holders of superior encum-
brances. The latter, such as purchase money mortgagees,
are lulled into a sense of invulnerability by state laws which
allow them to completely deplete the security when fore-
closure is necessary, without regard for or notice to in-
ferior lienholders.
The Maryland law, for instance, gives the purchaser at
a foreclosure sale the same title as was held by the mort-
gagor when the mortgage was recorded45 and this so effec-
tively disposes of junior encumbrances that the holders
thereof do not have to be joined in or notified of the fore-
closure action.46 The purchaser at such sale takes his title
free and clear of all junior mortgages and judgments, and
to assure himself of clear title it is only necessary that he
check the records prior to the recording date of the instru-
ment through which his title flows. If there are no senior
encumbrances, the liens of those which are junior are wiped
out as to the particular property involved, and there is no
necessity that the holders of the inferior liens be joined
in the foreclosure proceedings. The law is so well settled
in this regard as not to admit of argument, and the theory
is basic with those engaged in title work.
When, however, the junior encumbrance is a federal tax
lien, the situation is drastically altered, but to even discuss
the point with title attorneys unfamiliar with tax law
smacks of unconstitutionality and even approaches heresy.
However, it is quite apparent that the foreclosure of a
senior mortgage does not authorize the Secretary of the
Treasury to issue a certificate of release under Section
'1 Md. Code (1951), Art. 66, Sec. 7(c).
"Chilton v. Brooks, 71 Md. 445, 18 A. 868 (1889) ; Madore v. Thompson,
155 Md. 676, 142 A. 529 (1928).
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6325 - he may only do so under the five conditions set out
above. The foreclosing mortgagee could, under the fifth
alternative, apply for a discharge as to his particular prop-
erty by showing that its market value is not equal to the
mortgage indebtedness; but, failing this, the normal fore-
closure does not affect the tax lien and it remains in full
force and effect against the property in the hands of the
purchaser. 7
The cases cited above affirm the theory of law that the
individual states cannot, by statute or case law, exempt
their citizens from the will of the sovereign. The tax lien
is created by federal statute, and once it takes hold it can-
not be released, wiped out, or derogated from except as
provided by federal law.48
Assuming that a foreclosure has gone through without
release of the tax lien, what is the status of the purchaser's
title? It is, of course, clear of other junior liens by virtue
of state law, but the tax lien still attaches for the period
discussed under "Limitations". 49 If the Government chose
to enforce its lien and force sale of the property, it could do
so at any time and take advantage of possible appreciation
in value. The new owner could not, of course, apply for a
discharge after he purchases at a foreclosure sale, as that
has wiped out other encumbrances and he could not show
the Secretary, as required by Section 6325 (b) (2) (B) that
the tax lien has no value as to his specific property. There
is . provision of the Internal Revenue Code, Section 7324,
which does allow for such situations and provides a means
for the owner to clear his title. The procedure, however, is
cumbersome. First, the purchaser must request the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to file an action to clear title and then
wait six months for the inevitable refusal. After the Secre-
tary has refused to initiate the suit, the owner must petition
the District Court to be allowed to do so in his own name,
and if his petition is allowed, the action may then be
brought. This is not the end of the purchaser's troubles,
however, for if the suit establishes a claim existing in the
United States, then the Court must order sale of the prop-
erty and distribute the proceeds according to the priorities
'1 See Oden v. United States, 33 F. 2d 553 (D. C. W. D. La., 1929) ; Michi-
gan v. United States, 317 U. S. 338 (1943); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
United States, 107 F. 2d 311 (6th Cir., 1939) ; Integrity Trust Co. v. United
States, 3 F. Supp. 577 (D. C. N. J. 1933); United States v. Kensington
Shipyard & Drydock Corp., 169 F. 2d 9 (3rd Cir., 1948) ; Miners Say. Bank
of Pittston, Pa. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 563 (D. C. M. D. Pa., 1953),
and cases collected in 105 A. L. R. 1244; 174 A. L. R. 1373, 1403.
11 Miners Say. Bank of Pittston, Pa. v. United States, ibid, 570.
' Supra, circa, p. 10.
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as they may be found. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
United States," the Circuit Court of Appeals held that
under this statute it was powerless to decree clear title in
the purchaser even if it found that his superior interest in
the fair market value of the property, flowing through the
mortgagee, would completely wipe out that of the United
States. The Court said that in order to eliminate the tax
lien it must order a new sale of the property in a proceed-
ing to which the United States had been made a party.
A different result was reached in a district court case in
Pennsylvania where the Court felt that, under the pro-
visions of 28 U. S. C. A. Sec. 2410, it could decree clear title
to the purchaser without sale where it was clear that the
tax lien would not share in the proceeds if the property
were resold under the original mortgage." Had the value
of the property increased to the point where sale would
produce a surplus over the mortgage indebtedness, how-
ever, the Court would not reach the same result.
In either case, the proposition stands that the pur-
chaser has bought himself a law suit along with his prop-
erty, and he, no doubt, has few kind words for the heavy
armor in which Congress has sheathed the tax lien. But,
even though the necessity for collecting taxes makes such
strong measures necessary, recognition is given to mercan-
tile and commercial problems, and the federal law does
provide a relatively simple way for disposing of tax liens
before the title to property becomes enclouded and un-
merchantable.
Under the provisions of Title 28, U. S. C. A. Section 2410,
the United States has consented to be sued, in either state
or federal court, by any person desiring to quiet title to his
property or to foreclose a mortgage or other lien. The
statute applies to both realty and personalty, and provides
that a judicial sale under this section has the same effect
regarding discharge of the Government's lien as is given
to such matters by local law. In comparison to the methods
set out in Sections 6325 and 7424 of the Internal Revenue
Code, this manner of procedure appears to be the least
cumbersome, the least expensive, and the most expedient
way to dispose of junior tax liens; and the holder of a lien
inferior to that of the Government may likewise use this
section to initiate foreclosure action.
It must, however, be borne in mind that when the
United States consents to be sued, the suit must be in
107 F. 2d 311 (6th Cir., 1939).
Miners Sav. Bank of Pittston, Pa. v. United States, 8upra, n. 47, 572.
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strict accord with the consent given. Section 2410 requires
specifically:
1. A complaint describing with particularity the na-
ture of the Government's lien - the mere filing of
a mortgage with directions to the clerk to docket a
foreclosure action against the mortgagor and the
government would not be sufficient.
2. Naming the United States as party-defendant. -
Neither the Director of Internal Revenue nor the
Secretary of the Treasury is a proper party to the
suit.2
3. Service of the complaint upon the local United
States Attorney with copies mailed to the Attorney
General at Washington.
4. An allowance of sixty days for the Government to
file its answer - not some lesser time prescribed
by state practice.
5. A period of one year from date of sale within which
the United States may redeem the property sold.
With these requirements in mind, it would appear neces-
sary that the preliminary steps to foreclosure or execution
on judgment include a search of the Federal Tax Lien Index
to the last entry and not merely to the date of the mort-
gage or judgment. Special attention should also be given
to judgments against the owner to preclude the possibility
that such judgments might result from tax liens and cloud
title in the future. If such encumbrances are discovered,
then the interested party might apply for discharge under
Section 6325 by showing that the proceeds of sale would
leave nothing for the Government after satisfaction of the
mortgage or judgment. Assuming that such is not the case,
or that the interested party wishes to take immediate action
and not await a possibly delayed answer regarding the dis-
charge from the Internal Revenue Service, then suit may
be filed in either state or federal court. Both the mortgagee
and the United States should be made parties defendant,
and a concise explanation of the Government's interest will
suffice to satisfy the statute. State law probably does not
require service of process on the mortgagee, but a copy
must be mailed to the Attorney General in Washington,
52 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Charleston Lead Works, 24 F. 2d 836 (D. C.
E. D. S. C., 1928) ; Czieslik v. Burnet, 57 F. 2d 715 (D. C. E. D. N. Y., 1932).
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D.C., and service (preferably two copies of the pleadings)
made on the local United States Attorney. The ordinary
advertisement and notice of sale will probably have to be
altered as the Government is allowed sixty days in which to
answer the suit, but personal contact with the United States
Attorney may result in an agreement to speed up the an-
swer and allow an early sale. The advertisement should
also inform prospective purchasers of the one year re-
demption period.
When these requirements have been satisfied, there is
no further departure from normal procedure, and the sale
may progress without fear that a clouded and unmer-
chantable title might arise at some future date.
SUMMARY
As can be seen from the decisions cited herein, the
Courts have agreed with the words of the Supreme Court-
"[S] tronger language could hardly have been selected to
reveal a purpose to assure the collection of taxes' 3 - and
construed the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code to
carry out this avowed purpose.
We should bear in mind, then, that when a tax lien
enters into the picture, state statutes and precedents bow
out. The effect of the lien, its inception, duration, and re-
lease are all matters controlled by federal law, and every
competing interest is bound thereby. The most salient
features to be remembered are:
1. The tax lien is a general and perfected encumbrance
reaching all realty and personalty, including that after-
acquired, of the taxpayer.
2. Even though it is unrecorded, a tax lien takes preced-
ence over junior competing interests except those of mort-
gagees, pledgees, purchasers and judgment creditors.
3. The tax lien expires six years after assessment, un-
less there are proceedings in court within that period to
preserve the rights of collection.
4. Administrative discharge of a tax lien may be accom-
plished as spelled out in 26 U. S. C. A. 6325.
5. Judicial discharge of a tax lien may be accomplished
by making the United States a party to the court action and
following the provisions of 28 U. S. C. A. 2410.
8 8Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U. S. 265, 267 (1945).
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